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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Quinlan Did Not Waive Procedural 
Due Process Arguments 
As the Division of Real Estate (hereinafter, "the Division"), 
contends it is axiomatic that defects cural:)] e a t: t:i: 1.,i I, c a i n :io t be 
relied upon party if the trial court has not had an 
opportunity u :t an objection to those defects. Brinkerhoff 
vs. Schwendiman, 790 P.2d 587, 589 (Utah App. 1990). This is so 
that the trial court, in this case the Utah Real Estate Commission 
(hereinafter! mini: , 'nave an opportunity to cure 
alleged defects Oondas Condas, 618 P.2d 491, 495 n.8 (Utah 
1980). 
A . » i m u t t M I i i i i i I \ i i ! P l . i n h a i t f p n " I " I i I 'I I  r 'i I I1 ] d 
244, 249 (1973), objections to the proceedings of an administrative 
agency must be made while the agency has an opportunity to correct 
alleged defects. 
The crux of Quinlan's due process argument is that '^ N he had 
no opportunity to be heard by the Commission and (b) the Commission 
failed to re vie i * t:l I = r e c c >i : c:l • : f tl le pr oceedings before the 
Administrative Law Judge before rendering its final decision. 
Simply stated, Quinlan could not have asserted an objection 
before the Commission because he was i i :: • !:: a ] J owed ai i oppor tui ii ty t : • 
be heard Quinlan could not have timely presented an objection to 
1 
Commission procedures so that it might correct the defect which he 
claims. 
Because Quinlan was denied an opportunity to appear and be 
heard by the Commissipn and therefore had no opportunity to present 
objections to its procedure, he could not have waived the due 
process arguments set forth at pages nos. 17-19 of his initial 
Brief. 
II. 
Quinlan Was Denied Due Process 
The Department misconstrues the thrust of Quinlan's contention 
that he was denied due process. 
Quinlan acknowledges that the Commission may delegate a 
dispute to an Administrative Law Judge for hearing and an initial 
decision. 
Quinlan further acknowledges that the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law rendered by an Administrative Law Judge are mere 
recommendations. However, a fundamental component of procedural 
due process is the opportunity to be heard by the final decision 
maker. Admittedly, if appropriate procedures are implemented, a 
party may be "heard" by the ultimate decision maker even though a 
dispute is delegated to an Administrative Law Judge. 
In the Matter of License of Topik, 761 P.2d 32, 36, the Court 
stated: 
2 
The final decision maker may accept, add to, 
reject, or modify the recommendations of the 
A.L.J, as warranted by its review of the 
evidence and findings. (Citing N.L.R.B. vs. 
Oregon Worsted Co., 94 F.2d 671, 672 (9th Cir. 
1938)) (emphasis added). 
The propriety of proceeding with an evidentiary hearing before 
an Administrative Law Judge is not the issue. The issue is whether 
the failure of the Commission to consider the evidence and argument 
presented to the Administrative Law Judge constitutes a denial of 
due process. 
In the present case, Quinlan was denied an opportunity to 
present argument and evidence to the Commission. Because the 
Commission did not consider the evidence and argument presented to 
the Administrative Law Judge by Quinlan, Quinlan was denied 
procedural due process and the Commission's decision and the Order 
of the Executive Director must be vacated. 
III. 
The Commission's Orders Are 
Arbitrary and Capricious and Are Not Supported by 
Substantial Evidence 
Quinlan does not argue that the Commission is bound by the 
decision of the Administrative Law Judge. However, because the 
Commission adopted the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
recommended by the Administrative Law Judge (R. 27 and R. 29) the 
Commission's Orders could not be supported by substantial evidence 
and are arbitrary and capricious. 
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Admittedly, the Commission was free to substitute its own 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law for those recommended by 
the Administrative Law Judge. The Commission did not do this. 
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law adopted by the 
Commission are not consistent with its decision to suspend 
Quinlan's license to practice as a real estate sales agent. This 
inconsistency renders the Commissions Orders arbitrary and 
capricious and not supported by substantial evidence. 
IV. 
The Commission's Orders Are Not Consistent 
With Prior Agency Practice 
A. Ouinlan Has Established a Prima Facia Case of 
Inconsistency With Prior Agency Decisions 
In the interests of brevity and consistent with Rule 25(c) , 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Quinlan will not reiterate the 
detailed discussion of prior inconsistent agency decisions which 
appears at pages nos. 21-26 and 28-29 of his initial Brief. 
In summary, the Division argues that the present case is 
distinguishable from the decisions in In Re: Goodman, Case No. RE 
92-03-19 (Oct. 14, 1992) (attached to Petitioner7s Brief as 
Addendum V) and In Re: O'Brien, Case No. RE 90-11-23 (Jan. 17, 
1992) (attached to Petitioner's Brief as Addendum VII) because 
Quinlan received financial benefit from his criminal conduct. In 
both Goodman and O'Brien, the license holders received substantial 
4 
financial benefit from their misconduct. 
The Department also argues that the decisions cited by Quinlan 
are distinguishable because Quinlan had not completed the payment 
of Court ordered restitution, nor had he completed probation. In 
Goodman, the license holder had not completed federal probation and 
in In Re: Hutchinson, Case No. RE 91-03-04 (Nov. 20, 1991) 
(attached to Petitionees Brief as Addendum VI) the sales agent's 
license was placed on probation concurrent with the duration of his 
criminal probation. 
Quinlan has established a prima facia case of inconsistency 
with prior agency decisions. 
B. The Department Has Failed to Establish 
Consistency With Prior Agency Action 
In support of its claim of consistency, the Department cites 
eleven other cases in which the Division revoked or refused to 
grant real estate licenses. Each of those cases is distinguishable 
from the case at hand. 
Six of the eleven cited cases involve disputes in which a 
stipulation and order was entered. The Department admits that M . 
. such stipulated settlements are not subject to a strict 
standard of consistency. . . . because there are no findings of 
fact or conclusions of law, there is little in the record on which 
to base a comparison with this case at bar." (Respondent's Brief, 
page no. 17, f.n. 10). In addition, two of the remaining cases 
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involved orders entered by default. 
The facts involved in the remaining three cases differ 
substantially from the facts before this Court. 
In the Matter of Drew R. Miller, Case No. RE 89-07-14 (August 
8, 1989)(attached to Respondent's Brief as Addendum P) , the 
Commission adopted the Recommended Order of the Administrative Law 
Judge to the effect that Mr. Miller's license to practice as a real 
estate sales agent would have * no further force and effect*. 
However, the Commission also stated: 
"It is further ordered that the Commission 
will assess whether Respondent possesses the 
qualifications for licensure as a sales agent 
upon Respondent's request to meet with the 
Commission. Depending on that review, a 
determination shall be made whether 
Respondent's application for licensure should 
be granted". 
Mr. Miller received much more lenient treatment than did 
Quinlan. 
In addition, the numerous mitigating factors present in the 
case before the Court were not present in Miller. 
The order of the Commission in the Matter of James E. Gleason, 
Case No. RE 87-04-07 (July 13, 1988) (attached as Addendum R to 
Respondent's Brief) is similarly distinguishable. In Gleason, the 
Administrative Law Judge and the Commission specifically found that 
Mr. Gleason's license had been inactive for approximately four 
years prior to the entry of the Commission's order and that at the 
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time of the order, Mr. Gleason was incarcerated and would remain 
incarcerated for three additional years. In addition, no 
mitigating factors, such as those found in the present case, were 
involved in Gleason. . 
Similarly, in the Matter of Arlo McKee, Case No. RE 88-09-12 
(June 14, 1989)(attached to Respondents Brief as Addendum Q), Mr. 
McKee was a resident in a correctional center at the time of the 
entry of the order and the Commission did not find any mitigating 
factors. 
Thus, the Department's argument that its decision in the 
present matter is consistent with its prior decisions is based on 
nine cases involving stipulated orders or orders entered by default 
and three cases which are readily distinguishable from the facts 
present in this action. 
C. The Department Has Not Established 
a Fair and Rational Basis for Its Inconsistent Decision 
The only argument presented by the Department in support of 
its contention that it had a fair and rational basis for rendering 
an inconsistent decision is that Quinlan was convicted of a more 
serious crime than were the sales agents in O'Brien, Goodman, 
Hutchinson and Wilson. 
In Wilson, the sales agent was convicted of both mail fraud 
and conspiracy. 
In O'Brien, through a plea bargain, the sales agent was 
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convicted of attempted forgery. The agent was initially charged 
with "false evidence of title and registration" , a second degree 
felony. 
In Hutchinson, the sales agent was convicted of making a 
corrupt offer to a bank officer. 
The crimes committed by the sales agents in those cases are 
not less serious than the crime committed by Quinlan. Although one 
might argue as to the "seriousness" of different criminal conduct, 
there is no appreciable qualitative difference, or lack thereof, 
between the conduct of Quinlan and that of the three sales agents 
discussed above. 
The Department also argues that mitigating factors found in 
Goodman, Hutchinson, O'Brien and Wilson are not present in the 
matter before the Court. Quinlan has already addressed this 
contention in detail at pages nos. 7-14; 20-25; and 28-29 of his 
initial Brief. 
Quinlan has established a prima facia case of inconsistent 
treatment and the Commission has failed to provide a fair and 
rational explanation for its inconsistent decision. 
V. 
Unlawful Decision Making Process and 
Utah Administrative Code 
Quinlan concedes that R162-2-2.2.2.7, Utah Administrative 
Code, provides that the Division may consider matters involving 
8 
restitution and a criminal conviction. Quinlan apologizes to this 
Court and to the Department for the contrary statement set forth at 
page no. 30 of his initial Brief. Quinlan assures both this Court 
and the Department that the apparent mis-statement was not 
intentional. 
In response to the Department's argument concerning Section 
61-2-11(1) and (12), Utah Code Ann., Quinlan acknowledges that the 
Commission has the "authority" to suspend Quinlan's license. 
Quinlan contends, as argued above and below, that even though the 
Division possessed the appropriate authority, the suspension was 
inappropriate. 
VI. 
The Commission's Order, Dated 
December 3, 1994, Is Void 
The Department states that Quinlan's assertion, that the 
Order, dated November 3, 1993, was "confirmed, adopted and issued", 
is not true. Quinlan's statement to that effect is based on the 
language of that Order. That Order states: 
The above order is confirmed, adopted and thus 
issued this 3rd day of November, 1993. 
That statement is followed by the signature of Steven H. 
Stewart as Director of the Division of Real Estate. 
The fact that the Order of November 3, 1993, was not mailed to 
Quinlan has no effect on whether it was confirmed, adopted and 
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issued, any more than the fact that a judgment is not mailed to a 
defendant negates that judgment. 
Because the first Order was confirmed, adopted and issued, the 
second Order, dated December 3, 1993, is void. 
VII. 
Wrongful Ex Parte Communication 
Although Quinlan contends that the request communicated by the 
Director of the Division to Commission members that a different, 
more detailed, order be adopted was a wrongful ex parte 
communication, because the adoption of the Order proposed by the 
Division Director did not alter the Commission's decision, Quinlan 
will withdraw his argument to the effect that he was denied due 
process by that wrongful ex parte communication. 
CONCLUSION 
The Orders of the Commission, dated November 3, 1993, and 
December 3, 1993, and the Order on Review Denying Oral Argument 
issued by the Director of the Department should each be vacated for 
the following reasons: 
1. Quinlan was denied due process because he did not have an 
opportunity to present evidence or argument to the final decision 
maker, i.e. the Commission and the Commission did not consider the 
evidence and argument presented by Quinlan to the Administrative 
Law Judge. Quinlan did not waive his due process arguments because 
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he could not have presented those arguments and objections to the 
Commission; 
2. The Commission's Orders are inconsistent with its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and are therefore arbitrary 
and capricious and not supported by substantial evidence; 
3. The Commission's Orders are inconsistent with prior 
agency practice and the Commission has not offered a fair and 
rational basis for its inconsistent decision; and 
4. The Commission's Order, dated December 3, 1994, is void 
because the Commission had previously adopted, issued and confirmed 
a final Order in the same matter on November 3, 1993. 
Respectfully submitted this / / day of November, 1994. 
CROWTHER & REED 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that on the / / day of November, 1994, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Reply Brief of Petitioner 
was hand-delivered to: 
Lynn Nicholas 
Assistant Attorney General 
Consumer Rights Division 
Attorney for Respondent 
111 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0810 
12 
